Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

660 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Turner that Marshall had notifi ed the army fi eld commanders of
that message, telling them to inform the naval authorities. 145
Admiral Stark on Joint U.S.-British
War Plan and Morning of December 7
Admiral Harold R. Stark, chief of naval operations at the time
of the attack, was second in line of command to the president
in protecting the United States and its Navy. Stark had become
CNO on August 1, 1939, just one month before Hitler’s forces
marched into Poland, launching what became World War II.
Stark was known to his associates as “Betty,” his nickname from
Annapolis days. 146 He was genial, polite, soft-spoken, not blunt
or brusque like Admiral Richardson, who had stood up boldly to
FDR. But Stark was no milquetoast either. On occasion he would
tell FDR frankly what he thought, as he had, for instance, when
opposing the destroyer deal.
Stark appeared before the JCC on December 31, 1945. He
opened his testimony by reading a statement containing substantial
quotations from reports and letters to his fi eld commanders
during his term of offi ce. 147 When he assumed offi ce, Stark realized
U.S. naval forces were weak, so he had immediately set about
trying to obtain more ships, planes, weapons, and men. Navy budget
requests were fi rst made to the Bureau of the Budget, which
makes recommendations from which the president’s budget is
prepared and submitted to Congress. 148 Stark had appeared before
congressional committees to request authorization and funds,
pointing out the increasing demands for men and materiel for the
145Ibid., part 4, pp. 1971–72.
146Ibid., part 5, p. 2172.
147Ibid., pp. 2097–35.
148Ibid., p. 2458.