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Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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Joint Congressional Committee, <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack: Part 1 659<br />

Turner was unequivocal: Any U.S. action against Germany<br />

would be “self defense” <strong>and</strong> would never be considered “aggression”!<br />

“[T]he future security” <strong>of</strong> the United States <strong>and</strong> that <strong>of</strong><br />

the United Kingdom were inextricably allied “from the defensive<br />

viewpoint”! Roosevelt, Hull, <strong>and</strong> Stark were all sent copies <strong>of</strong><br />

Turner’s memor<strong>and</strong>um <strong>of</strong> that meeting. Turner told the JCC he<br />

received no indication from any <strong>of</strong> them that they disagreed or<br />

disapproved <strong>of</strong> what he had written. 142<br />

When asked about the December 6 Japanese intercepts,<br />

Turner recalled seeing the “Pilot Message” <strong>and</strong> the fi rst 13 parts<br />

<strong>of</strong> the Japanese reply “some time just preceding the 7th, some<br />

night, <strong>and</strong> I now believe it to have been the night <strong>of</strong> December<br />

6, about 11:30 p.m.” He said an <strong>of</strong>fi cer came to his house; he had<br />

been in bed but “went down <strong>and</strong> read a long dispatch in several<br />

parts” which he believed was “the dispatch in question.” When<br />

asked to whom the <strong>of</strong>fi cer had shown these papers, the <strong>of</strong>fi cer<br />

replied, “Admiral Wilkinson, Admiral Ingersoll, <strong>and</strong> Secretary<br />

Knox.” Th us assured that the responsible Navy <strong>of</strong>fi cials had been<br />

advised, Turner “did nothing more about it.” He did not recall<br />

seeing the 14th part “until after the attack.” 143<br />

At about 10:30 on Sunday morning, December 7, Stark<br />

phoned Turner at his home, asking him to come to the <strong>of</strong>fi ce.<br />

Once there, Stark asked him to draft a reply to Hart’s inquiry concerning<br />

Creighton’s report that the United States had promised<br />

armed support to the British <strong>and</strong> Dutch in the far east. 144 Turner<br />

had been working on that when Stark summoned him, at about<br />

12 or 12:15, <strong>and</strong> showed him the “One p.m. Message.” Stark told<br />

142Joint Committee, <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack, part 4, p. 2041.<br />

143Ibid., pp. 1970–71.<br />

144Ibid., p. 1971, Stark testimony. See also ibid., pp. 1935–16, Turner testimony<br />

concerning reply prepared December 7 for Hart, <strong>and</strong> part 10, pp. 5082–83,<br />

Creighton testimony before the Joint Committee.

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