Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

658 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
States “would very defi nitely bring on war with Japan.” 136 He had
“expected they [the Japanese] would make some sort of an attack
on Hawaii.” 137 He told the JCC he had considered a surprise
attack on Pearl Harbor not simply a “possibility” but “probable.” 138
Th e attack, he said, had come as no surprise to him.
When stationed in Japan in 1939, Turner testifi ed, he knew
the Japanese naval attaché. Both men had come to Washington at
about the same time. After Japanese Ambassador Nomura arrived
in Washington in February 1941, the naval attaché arranged for
Turner to meet Nomura about March fi rst. Turner wrote a memorandum
to CNO Stark about that meeting, saying he thought
he should continue the talks. 139 Th ey met several more times.
On July 21, 1941, Turner “told the Ambassador [Nomura]
that I believed that Congress would declare war if they [the
Japanese] attacked either the Dutch or the British in Malaya.” 140
According to Turner’s memorandum of that meeting, Turner had
pointed out to Nomura that
it is decidedly against the military interests of the United States
to permit the United Kingdom to be overcome by Germany.
For this reason any action which the United States could take
against Germany is necessarily one of self defense and would
never be considered as aggression. Furthermore, anything that
aff ects the future security of the United Kingdom in any part
of the world, also is of interest to the United States from the
defensive viewpoint. 141
136Ibid., part 32, p. 604.
137Ibid., part 33, p. 878.
138Ibid., part 4, p. 1940.
139Ibid., p. 2041.
140Ibid., p. 2042.
141Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States: Japan, 1931–1941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Offi ce, 1943), vol. 2, p. 519.