Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 657
Gerow volunteered a description of his responsibility as chief
of War Plans. It had been
to prepare [action, not information] messages and submit
them to the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War for their
approval. In any emergency, if the Chief of Staff was not there,
I would assume the responsibility for sending them and accept
the consequences if I made a mistake. 132
Ferguson also questioned Gerow about crucial December
1941 messages. Gerow reaffi rmed his statements to Lieutenant
Colonel Clausen—he recalled neither Bratton’s recommendation
that additional warnings be sent the overseas commanders
because Japanese diplomats had been told to destroy their codes
and code machines, 133 nor Sadtler’s telling him on December
5 that a “Winds Code Execute had been received.” 134 And he
denied receiving the “Pilot Message” and the fi rst 13 parts of
Japan’s reply on December 6; he didn’t see them until December
7 “at 11:30 in the Chief of Staff ’s offi ce.” 135
Admiral Turner (Navy War Plans):
U.S. Defense Encompasses Defense of U.K.
Against Japan and Germany
Admiral Turner, the 1941 chief of the Navy’s war plans section,
fi rst came before the JCC on December 19. He was fl amboyant,
something of a braggadocio, with a reputation for liking
more liquor than was good for him. He had boasted before the
Navy Court of Inquiry that he “had expressed the opinion previously”
that the July 1941 freezing of Japanese assets in the United
132Ibid., p. 1653.
133Ibid., pp. 1627–30.
134Ibid., p. 1631.
135Ibid., pp. 1634–36