Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Foreign Relations in an Election Year 45
On November 1 the Atlantic Squadron of the “unneutral”
U.S. Neutrality Patrol became known as the “Patrol Force” of the
newly reorganized Atlantic Fleet.
Retaining the Fleet at Pearl Harbor
Th e U.S. Fleet, which had left the west coast on April 2,
1940, for maneuvers, had been ordered in May to stay in Hawaii.
Th e commander-in-chief, Admiral Richardson, had objected
strenuously, but to no avail. Th e fl eet remained in Hawaii. In
July Richardson went to Washington to present to his superiors
in person the reasons why he believed the Fleet should not
be retained at Pearl Harbor. He also sought answers to several
questions—why the fl eet was being retained there, how long it
was expected to stay there, and what eff orts were being made to
adequately man the fl eet.
Richardson explained the lack of security at Pearl Harbor. He
described the congestion and the diffi culty of operating ships in
and out of its narrow entrance. He cited the inadequate facilities
for fl eet services, training, recreation, and housing. He pointed
out also that the prolonged and indefi nite stay away from the
mainland during peacetime was bad for the morale of the men.
But perhaps even more important than all these reasons was the
fact that the fl eet at Pearl Harbor was not in a state of preparedness.
If we went to war, it would have to return to the west coast
to be outfi tted, and that could involve a net loss of time. 36
Richardson met and talked with the president, secretaries of
state (Hull) and Navy (Knox), Chief of Naval Operations (Stark),
Chief of the Bureau of Navigation (Chester W. Nimitz), the
Army Chief of Staff (George C. Marshall), state department offi -
cials, and several members of Congress. His arguments as to why
the fl eet should not be kept in Hawaii seemed to fall on deaf ears;
36 Richardson, On the Treadmill, pp. 307–18, 383–95.