Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

656 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
General Gerow (Army War Plans)
Discusses Short’s Sabotage Alert and
December 6–7 Events
General Gerow maintained his November 27 dispatch had
given Short suffi cient warning and that Short’s reply—“Report
department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy”—
could have been taken “to mean that he was alerted to prevent
sabotage and . . . also prepared to conduct reconnaissance and other
defensive missions.” 128 It could even have been “interpreted as
meaning that the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department,
had prepared for an attack of the kind that was actually made.” 129
Hence no follow-up had been considered.
Senator Ferguson, a relentless examiner, quoted from the Staff
Offi cers’ Field Manual:
Th e responsibilities of the commander and his staff do not end
with the issue of the necessary orders. Th ey must insure receipt
of the orders by the proper commanders, make certain they are
understood, and enforce their eff ective execution. 130
He asked Gerow if Short, after having reported the measures
taken and “[n]ot having heard anything for the number of days
between the 28th and the 7th,” wouldn’t have had “a right to rely
upon that fact, that [he] had understood his order, and that he
had properly interpreted the order of the 27th?” Gerow replied:
“I think that is correct.” 131
128Ibid., part 4, p. 1638.
129Ibid., p. 1640.
130 War Department. Staff Offi cers’ Field Manual: Th e Staff and Combat Orders.
FM 101-5. August 19, 1940, prepared under the direction of the Chief of
Staff , G.C. Marshall, p. 39, paragraph 63, “Supervision of Execution.”
131 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 4, p. 1647.