Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ... Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 655 engaged in “extensive examination . . . far beyond what the legal staff anticipated.” 126 Mitchell reminded the committee on December 14 that it has been sitting regularly for a month, including all Saturdays but one. During that period only 8 witnesses have been completely examined . . . there remain at least 60 witnesses to be examined. Many of these witnesses are quite as crucial as those who have testifi ed. At the rate of progress during the past month, it seems certain that several more months of hearings will be required. . . . Th e joint resolution of the Congress under which the committee is acting requires a fi nal report of the committee to be made not later than January 3, 1946. . . . Since the start of the hearing it has become increasingly apparent that some members of the committee have a diff erent view than that entertained by counsel, either as to the scope of the inquiry or as to what is pertinent evidence. As a result, the hearings had been prolonged. Th erefore, it was “necessary” for Mitchell “to ask the committee to arrange for other counsel to carry on.” 127 Congress granted the committee an extension. While the committee searched for replacements for Mitchell and his staff , the hearings continued with testimony from several more top military offi cials. 126 Ibid., part 4, p. 1586. 127 Ibid., pp. 1585–86.

656 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy General Gerow (Army War Plans) Discusses Short’s Sabotage Alert and December 6–7 Events General Gerow maintained his November 27 dispatch had given Short suffi cient warning and that Short’s reply—“Report department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy”— could have been taken “to mean that he was alerted to prevent sabotage and . . . also prepared to conduct reconnaissance and other defensive missions.” 128 It could even have been “interpreted as meaning that the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, had prepared for an attack of the kind that was actually made.” 129 Hence no follow-up had been considered. Senator Ferguson, a relentless examiner, quoted from the Staff Offi cers’ Field Manual: Th e responsibilities of the commander and his staff do not end with the issue of the necessary orders. Th ey must insure receipt of the orders by the proper commanders, make certain they are understood, and enforce their eff ective execution. 130 He asked Gerow if Short, after having reported the measures taken and “[n]ot having heard anything for the number of days between the 28th and the 7th,” wouldn’t have had “a right to rely upon that fact, that [he] had understood his order, and that he had properly interpreted the order of the 27th?” Gerow replied: “I think that is correct.” 131 128Ibid., part 4, p. 1638. 129Ibid., p. 1640. 130 War Department. Staff Offi cers’ Field Manual: Th e Staff and Combat Orders. FM 101-5. August 19, 1940, prepared under the direction of the Chief of Staff , G.C. Marshall, p. 39, paragraph 63, “Supervision of Execution.” 131 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 4, p. 1647.

Joint Congressional Committee, <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack: Part 1 655<br />

engaged in “extensive examination . . . far beyond what the legal<br />

staff anticipated.” 126<br />

Mitchell reminded the committee on December 14 that it<br />

has been sitting regularly for a month, including all Saturdays<br />

but one. During that period only 8 witnesses have been completely<br />

examined . . . there remain at least 60 witnesses to be<br />

examined. Many <strong>of</strong> these witnesses are quite as crucial as those<br />

who have testifi ed. At the rate <strong>of</strong> progress during the past<br />

month, it seems certain that several more months <strong>of</strong> hearings<br />

will be required. . . .<br />

Th e joint resolution <strong>of</strong> the Congress under which the committee<br />

is acting requires a fi nal report <strong>of</strong> the committee to be made<br />

not later than January 3, 1946. . . . Since the start <strong>of</strong> the hearing<br />

it has become increasingly apparent that some members <strong>of</strong><br />

the committee have a diff erent view than that entertained by<br />

counsel, either as to the scope <strong>of</strong> the inquiry or as to what is<br />

pertinent evidence.<br />

As a result, the hearings had been prolonged. Th erefore, it was<br />

“necessary” for Mitchell “to ask the committee to arrange for<br />

other counsel to carry on.” 127<br />

Congress granted the committee an extension. While the<br />

committee searched for replacements for Mitchell <strong>and</strong> his staff ,<br />

the hearings continued with testimony from several more top<br />

military <strong>of</strong>fi cials.<br />

126 Ibid., part 4, p. 1586.<br />

127 Ibid., pp. 1585–86.

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