Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 653
A cartoon by C.D. Batchelor published in the same issue portrayed
Japanese Prime Minister Tojo in the garb of a town-crier
marching through the streets of Washington with a sandwich
board reading, “We are going to attack early in December. Please
don’t tell Kimmel and Short,” signed “TOJO.” Below the cartoon
the words: “Th ey didn’t.”
Th e TOP SECRET documents that Barkley gave the press
introduced to the public still more evidence of warnings received
in Washington in advance of the Japanese attack—the deadlines
the Japanese had fi xed for serious negotiations with the
United States to end, a December 3 intercept reporting that the
Japanese were destroying their codes and code machines, and the
U.S. Navy’s interception on December 4 of the Japanese “Winds
Execute” indicating “War with England, war with America, peace
with Russia.” 121
Marshall is Asked about “Winds Code”
Mentioned in APHB Report
Marshall returned to the hearings after meeting with Truman.
His questioning continued with Representative Keefe, a tall man
with broad shoulders, a lawyer with a deep voice when he wanted
to use it. He interrogated Marshall vigorously, introducing into
the record a great deal of information previously missed. He did
not let the general evade responsibility for the failure to respond to
Short’s inadequate sabotage alert, or for his unexplained unavailability
during the evening of December 6 and the early morning
hours of December 7. 122
When Marshall took the witness seat on Th ursday, December
13, Senator Lucas asked about the “Winds Code,” which had
been mentioned in the APHB documents just released. Had
121 Ibid., pp. 1443–97.
122 Ibid., pp. 1421–22, 1429–30.