Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

648 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
latter was the most improbable. . . . We thought it [Hawaii] was
impregnable against a Japanese landing expedition. 114
Although he had known from Admiral Richardson that the
fl eet would have to be built up and properly supplied before going
out to sea, he didn’t think anyone had ever told him, prior to
December 7, that “the United States Fleet in the Pacifi c Ocean,
was not able to take care of itself in the event of an attack.” 115
Ferguson continued to question Marshall when the committee
reassembled on Monday; he questioned him all that day
and Tuesday morning also. He asked Marshall about the “Pilot
Message,” which had been received in Washington on December
6, and how he accounted for its not being delivered to him that
day. Marshall didn’t answer directly. He digressed about the fi rst
13 parts and admitted he had been in Washington that entire day.
He said “there was someone on duty in the offi ce of the Chief of
Staff , there was someone on duty in the offi ce of the War Plans
Division, there was someone on duty in the offi ce of G-2,” who
presumably could have received this particular message and acted.
Finally, however, as Ferguson pressed him, he stated: “Th e point is
I did not receive the [Pilot] message” that day. 116
When the afternoon session opened, the chairman announced
that Marshall had been called to the White House for a conference
with President Truman about his mission to China. Marshall
left the hearing room at 3:00.
114Ibid., pp. 1170–71.
115Ibid., p. 1163.
116Ibid., pp. 1321–22.