Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 647
shortage of manpower in deciphering Japanese codes was not due
to lack of congressional appropriations; 105 that we had been trying
to keep secret the fact that Great Britain was informed of what
we were reading in the Japanese codes before the attack; 106 that
he, Marshall, was not aware that the sending of diplomatic intelligence
to Kimmel was discontinued sometime in August 1941; 107
that Marshall denied knowing that the Japanese had learned we
were reading their codes; 108 that portions of the Roberts report
were withdrawn before it was made public; 109 that the United
States initiated the Anglo-Dutch-American Agreement; 110 that
he, Stimson, and Knox had approved the agreement; 111 that it
went into general eff ect before the attack “because it involved the
policy of the main fi ght in the Atlantic and the defensive principle
in the Pacifi c”; 112 and that prior to December 1941 offi cers
of the United States were furnished to China for combat duty
against Japan. 113
Marshall also admitted that he thought
the Japanese were engaged in a campaign southward from the
China Sea. . . . We had in mind the possibility of an eff ort on
the Panama Canal. We had in mind the possibility of an eff ort
to strike a blow at our air plants in Seattle, at our air plants in
San Diego, and we had in mind the possibility of a blow in
the Central Pacifi c, in the Hawaiian district. We thought the
105 Ibid., pp. 1196–97.
106 Ibid., p. 1198.
107 Ibid., p. 1199.
108 Ibid., p. 1203.
109 Ibid., p. 1206.
110 Ibid., p. 1218.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid., p. 1221.
113 Ibid., pp. 1229–30.