Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

646 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
attention” because the fi rst to the thirteenth part “did not include
the critical statements.” 99
3. In response to the charge that he had failed to investigate and
determine Short’s “state of readiness . . . between November 27
and December 7,” he denied that they had in Washington any
“intimation that that [Hawaiian] command was not ready.” As a
matter of fact, he “had no reason to believe that that command
was anything other than highly effi cient and alert.” 100
At midmorning Saturday, when Gearhart fi nished his questioning,
Ferguson took over. As chief of the (privately paid)
minority staff , I was at his elbow as usual with a collection of documents
and a host of important questions to be asked. 101 Ferguson
persisted in his questioning until Marshall had to admit it was
his responsibility, not Gerow’s, to see that Short was adequately
alerted.
Ferguson’s pointed questioning lasted the rest of the day.
Marshall fi nally had to admit that he was the only Army offi cer
with authority over Short; 102 that Gerow had no authority under
Army regulations for sending an alert to Short; 103 that no responsible
Army offi cer was on duty Saturday evening, December 6,
or Sunday morning, December 7, who could take action before
Marshall’s belated arrival at his offi ce that morning; 104 that the
99 Ibid., pp. 1320–21.
100 Ibid., pp. 1182–83.
101 Congress had provided no funds for a research staff to assist the Committee’s
minority members. Th erefore, journalist John T. Flynn, who had been
interested for some time in establishing the responsibility for the Pearl Harbor
disaster, had raised funds to pay for me and a staff of seven to assist the Republicans.
Flynn had written and published privately two pamphlets which had
created quite a sensation: “Th e Truth About Pearl Harbor” (fi rst published in
the Chicago Tribune, October 22, 1944) and “Th e Final Secret of Pearl Harbor”
(September 1945).
102 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 3, pp. 1183, 1188.
103 Ibid., pp. 1188, 1202.
104 Ibid., pp. 1114, 1184–85.