Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 645
quite apparent from the reading of those messages that were
received, decoded, and placed on your desk, read or not read,
that many messages directing the attention of our military and
naval authorities to Hawaii had been received?
Marshall had no recollection of having read any of those messages
until preparing for the JCC hearings. 96
Marshall also defended himself against the APHB’s several
charges:
1. In response to the charge that he had failed “To keep the
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department fully
advised,” Marshall insisted he had given Short the information
he needed, as a responsible commander, to be prepared for the
possibility or probability of war. Th e mass of data that poured
into Washington, he said, would “merely impose an additional
burden.” It was “a matter of judgment” how much additional
information should have gone to him. Marshall thought “only the
December 7 message of 1:00 p.m. applied,” although he admitted
“off hand that the messages you just read [the ships-in-harbor
bomb plot messages] . . . would have been helpful to General
Short, but particularly more so to Admiral Kimmel.” 97
2. In response to the charge that he should have gotten in touch
with Short on the evening of December 6, when “the critical
information indicating an almost immediate break with Japan”
had come in, Marshall testifi ed that he did not believe it had “any
specifi c bearing one way or the other on General Short’s situation
and responsibility.” 98 Moreover, he reiterated that he “knew nothing
of the [13-part] message whatsoever” until his arrival in the
War Department on the morning of December 7. He presumed
“it was not thought necessary to bring that to my immediate
96 Ibid., p. 1181.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid., p. 1182.