Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

644 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
By this time Marshall had been on the witness stand for two
full days, and the Republicans had not begun to question him.
Th e committee regularly held Saturday hearings, so it recessed
until 10 the next morning.
Marshall’s Interrogation Continued
When the hearing resumed on Saturday morning the
Republicans began questioning Marshall. Determined to fi nd
out if he could explain some of the mysteries surrounding the
Japanese attack, they refused to yield to Democratic pressure to
curtail their interrogation.
Gearhart began. He told Marshall that Gerow had “accepted
full responsibility for not having acted on the inadequacy, as he
called it,” of Short’s November 27 report that he had alerted for
sabotage. Marshall had not been in the room when Gerow testifi
ed but, he said, he “admires very much his attitude.” When
Gearhart asked Marshall why he had not taken exception to
Short’s reply, the general could only say “that was my opportunity
to intervene and have a further check made and I did not take it.
Just why, I do not know.” 94 Short had been “issued a command,”
Marshall said,
and directed to do something. . . . Once you issue an order,
amendments or, you might say, codicils are very dangerous
business when it is an operational order. . . . [I]f possible . . . you
must avoid confusing the commander with a mass of data. 95
Gearhart read to Marshall the several so-called “Bomb Plot”
messages concerning the location of ships in Pearl Harbor, which
had been received, decoded, and translated in Washington prior
to the attack. Wasn’t it
94 Ibid., pp. 1172–73.
95 Ibid., pp. 1176–77.