Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 643
developments.” Marshall said, “[S]o far as Mr. Hull personally
[was] concerned,” he had been. Marshall had “a very distinct recollection”
of Hull’s saying “with considerable emphasis in those
last days apropos of his discussions with the Japanese envoys,
‘Th ese fellows mean to fi ght and you will have to watch out’.” 90
Marshall said he had expected that the fi rst Japanese attack on
the United States “would occur in the Philippines.” He thought
they would go
directly south towards Singapore, that that would be the
main campaign, and the Philippines, of course, would become
involved in it. . . [and he] assumed that Guam . . . and . . . Wake
would fall almost immediately. 91
[He] felt . . . that if the Japanese became engaged in hostilities
directed toward the Malay Peninsula that our situation
demanded that we take action to defend our position. Th at,
however, was my opinion, and that would have to be determined
by governmental action. 92
As the usual time for adjournment on Friday afternoon
approached, the fi fth of the six Democratic Committee members
was just starting his questioning.
Murphy: Had you any warning, General, or any reason to
expect on the night of December 6 or on the early morning
of December 7 that there was any special urgency requiring
you to be at the War Department earlier than the hour you did
arrive there on the morning of December 7.
Marshall: I had no such conception or information. 93
90 Ibid., part 3, p. 1148.
91 Ibid., p. 1149.
92 Ibid., p. 1338.
93 Ibid., p. 1163.