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Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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642 <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Seeds</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Fruits</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Infamy</strong><br />

Marshall Interrogated about<br />

December 7 Events<br />

Mitchell asked Marshall, “Did you have any talk on the<br />

morning <strong>of</strong> the 7th with Secretary Stimson before the news <strong>of</strong><br />

the attack came in?” Marshall didn’t recall talking with Stimson<br />

that morning, couldn’t recall seeing him “before lunch,” although<br />

he knew Stimson “was at the State Department” that morning. 87<br />

A little later Mitchell asked:<br />

Do you remember whether you had been told or telephoned<br />

or informed in any way on the evening <strong>of</strong> the 6th, late in the<br />

evening, that any arrangement had been made for a meeting<br />

between Secretary Stimson <strong>and</strong> Mr. Hull on the next<br />

morning?<br />

Marshall had “no such recollection.” 88<br />

Th en how did Marshall know Stimson was at the State<br />

Department on the morning <strong>of</strong> December 7? Th e meeting <strong>of</strong><br />

Stimson <strong>and</strong> Knox with Hull at the State Department had been<br />

arranged Saturday night after the three secretaries were informed<br />

<strong>of</strong> the fi rst 13 parts <strong>of</strong> the Japanese reply. 89 Yet Marshall denied<br />

that he had been “informed in any way on the evening <strong>of</strong> the 6th”<br />

<strong>of</strong> the plan for that meeting. And if he knew <strong>of</strong> that meeting, why<br />

did he not also know about the 13-part Japanese reply that had<br />

sparked it? Marshall testifi ed consistently that he fi rst saw those<br />

13 parts, together with the 14th part, only after he arrived at his<br />

<strong>of</strong>fi ce in the War Department at about 11:30 on the morning <strong>of</strong><br />

December 7.<br />

JCC member Cooper asked Marshall if in the weeks before<br />

the attack he had been “kept fully advised as to diplomatic<br />

87 Ibid., p. 1115.<br />

88 Ibid.<br />

89 Ibid., part 33, p. 857.

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