Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 641
If they had not been able to reach you on the morning of the
7th, or at any time when an important message came in, was
there anybody but yourself that had authority to send a warning
message to the outlying posts?
“Yes,” Marshall said. “Th e authority was vested, for instance,
in the Deputy Chief of Staff [Major General William Bryden].
Or even the head of War Plans Division [Gerow].” 84
According to Army regulations No. 10-15, updated to
December 7, 1941, however, this was not the precise situation.
“Th e Deputy Chief of Staff ” was the only offi cer who had the
authority to act for the chief of staff in his absence. Orders could
be sent to Short in Pearl Harbor by Roosevelt, Marshall, or
Marshall’s deputy. Neither Stimson nor Gerow was in the line of
command. Th at was why they had chosen to send the November
27 “war warning” over Marshall’s name. 85
Later in answer to a question from Senator Ferguson,
Marshall said that Gerow did not “normally” have any right to
issue orders to Short on a command basis; in peacetime it “would
have required quite an assumption of authority on his part to do
that without some confi rmation from a senior offi cer.” However,
Marshall said, “Th e president, the Secretary of War, and myself,
and in my absence, the deputy” had authority to order into eff ect
a war plan, Rainbow, or any other orders. 86
In any event, apparently no arrangement was in place for anyone
to act in Marshall’s stead on that fateful morning of December
7, 1941, when he was unavailable. And the orderly, supposedly on
duty at his home, failed to reach him promptly.
84 Ibid.
85Ibid., part 14, pp. 1416–21, Exhibit 42.
86Ibid., part 3, p. 1115.