Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...
Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ... Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...
Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 639 committee, “When I reached the end of the document the next sheet was the 1:00 message of December 7.” Th is was “indicative” to Marshall and to “all the others who came into the room, of some very defi nite action at 1:00, because that 1:00 was Sunday and was in Washington and involved the Secretary of State.” Taken together, all these factors were “rather unusual.” 78 Marshall’s account of his response to the messages was similar to those of Bratton and Gerow, both of whom had testifi ed on the basis of memoranda prepared shortly after the attack. 79 Marshall told of contacting Stark and of dispatching the last-minute warning to the fi eld commanders in the Pacifi c, giving fi rst priority to the Philippines and Panama. After Bratton had taken Marshall’s dispatch to the message center and returned, Marshall sent him back with Colonel Bundy, the offi cer in charge of the immediate details of all Pacifi c aff airs, to ask when the messages would be delivered. Th ey came back with estimates of the delivery times in various parts of the world. 80 Th e next information Marshall received was “the notifi cation of the actual attack on Pearl Harbor.” He said he could not recall “whether I was at the War Department or at the house.” He said General Deane, acting secretary of the general staff at that time, had told him that he had returned to his home, but his orderly said he was at the War Department. 81 Most astonishing! Th e Army’s chief of staff , who was directly concerned with the defense of the country and the protection of the fl eet when in harbor, who had just fi red off an urgent message to the fi eld commanders, who had been concerned about the likely time when the messages would be delivered, didn’t know 78Ibid., part 3, p. 1108. 79Bratton testimony, APHB and below, pp. 778–85 and 802–04; Gerow testimony, above, pp. 627–31. 80Ibid., p. 1109. 81 Ibid.
640 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy where he was when he heard the news of the attack. And yet that Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor so shocked the rest of the country that almost everybody remembers vividly precisely where they were when they heard the news. Marshall said information about the attack “then came in in fuller detail, and telephone communication was established.” He talked on the phone with Short’s chief of staff , Colonel Phillips. General Short “had gone to his command post and therefore was not able to talk to me directly.” Marshall volunteered: “You could hear the explosions at the time.” 82 JCC Counsel Asks Marshall about His Command Structure Did you have your staff organized at that time so that if an especially signifi cant or important intercept was made of a Jap message, was there anyone on duty who had authority, if they were unable to reach you, to send a warning message out? Marshall said he didn’t “think there was a set-up for that special purpose.” Th e War Department “had an arrangement there whereby the offi cer on the receiving end . . . knew where the principal people were, where to reach them.” In his own case, Marshall said that during that period and for about a year thereafter, he always maintained an orderly at the house at the telephone. If I left the house to go to a moving picture, which was about the only place I went, [the orderly] was there and knew where to reach me. 83 Mitchell then asked him, 82Ibid., pp. 1109–10. Emphasis added. 83Ibid., p. 1114.
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640 <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Seeds</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Fruits</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Infamy</strong><br />
where he was when he heard the news <strong>of</strong> the attack. And yet that<br />
Japanese attack on <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> so shocked the rest <strong>of</strong> the country<br />
that almost everybody remembers vividly precisely where they<br />
were when they heard the news.<br />
Marshall said information about the attack “then came in in<br />
fuller detail, <strong>and</strong> telephone communication was established.” He<br />
talked on the phone with Short’s chief <strong>of</strong> staff , Colonel Phillips.<br />
General Short “had gone to his comm<strong>and</strong> post <strong>and</strong> therefore was<br />
not able to talk to me directly.” Marshall volunteered: “You could<br />
hear the explosions at the time.” 82<br />
JCC Counsel Asks Marshall about<br />
His Comm<strong>and</strong> Structure<br />
Did you have your staff organized at that time so that if an<br />
especially signifi cant or important intercept was made <strong>of</strong> a Jap<br />
message, was there anyone on duty who had authority, if they<br />
were unable to reach you, to send a warning message out?<br />
Marshall said he didn’t “think there was a set-up for that special<br />
purpose.” Th e War Department “had an arrangement there<br />
whereby the <strong>of</strong>fi cer on the receiving end . . . knew where the principal<br />
people were, where to reach them.” In his own case, Marshall<br />
said that during that period <strong>and</strong> for about a year thereafter, he<br />
always maintained an orderly at the house at the telephone. If<br />
I left the house to go to a moving picture, which was about the<br />
only place I went, [the orderly] was there <strong>and</strong> knew where to<br />
reach me. 83<br />
Mitchell then asked him,<br />
82Ibid., pp. 1109–10. Emphasis added.<br />
83Ibid., p. 1114.