Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 639
committee, “When I reached the end of the document the next
sheet was the 1:00 message of December 7.” Th is was “indicative”
to Marshall and to “all the others who came into the room, of
some very defi nite action at 1:00, because that 1:00 was Sunday
and was in Washington and involved the Secretary of State.”
Taken together, all these factors were “rather unusual.” 78
Marshall’s account of his response to the messages was similar
to those of Bratton and Gerow, both of whom had testifi ed on the
basis of memoranda prepared shortly after the attack. 79 Marshall
told of contacting Stark and of dispatching the last-minute warning
to the fi eld commanders in the Pacifi c, giving fi rst priority to
the Philippines and Panama. After Bratton had taken Marshall’s
dispatch to the message center and returned, Marshall sent him
back with Colonel Bundy, the offi cer in charge of the immediate
details of all Pacifi c aff airs, to ask when the messages would be
delivered. Th ey came back with estimates of the delivery times in
various parts of the world. 80
Th e next information Marshall received was “the notifi cation
of the actual attack on Pearl Harbor.” He said he could not recall
“whether I was at the War Department or at the house.” He said
General Deane, acting secretary of the general staff at that time,
had told him that he had returned to his home, but his orderly
said he was at the War Department. 81
Most astonishing! Th e Army’s chief of staff , who was directly
concerned with the defense of the country and the protection of
the fl eet when in harbor, who had just fi red off an urgent message
to the fi eld commanders, who had been concerned about the
likely time when the messages would be delivered, didn’t know
78Ibid., part 3, p. 1108.
79Bratton testimony, APHB and below, pp. 778–85 and 802–04; Gerow testimony,
above, pp. 627–31.
80Ibid., p. 1109.
81 Ibid.