Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 637
Th e general was supposed to have had a duty offi cer at his
offi ce and an orderly at his home who knew where he was at all
times. None of his duty offi cers or orderlies was called to testify.
Mitchell asked Marshall when he fi rst knew about the 14-part
Japanese message and the “One p.m. Message,” and “under what
circumstances.” He did not answer directly.
I fi rst was aware of this message when I reached . . . the offi ce
on the morning of Sunday, December the 7th. On that particular
morning, I presumably had my breakfast at about eight,
and following the routine that I had carried out on previous
Sundays, I went riding at some time thereafter.
However, he said that on further consideration and discussion
with others, he had come to the conclusion, “purely by induction
and not by defi nite memory,” that that morning he must have
gone out riding later than 8:00, “just what time I do not know;
but between 8:00 and the time I went to the War Department I
ate my breakfast, I probably looked at the Sunday papers and I
went for a ride.” Marshall then discussed the “average length” of
his rides, about 50 minutes, “because I rode at a pretty lively gait,
at a trot and a canter and at a full run down on the experimental
farm where the Pentagon now is and returned to the house, so I
would say that the high probability is that the ride was an hour or
less, generally or certainly not longer.” 73
Th is entire testimony related to what Marshall “presumably,”
“probably,” “generally” did on a Sunday morning, not what he
actually did on that specifi c Sunday morning, December 7, 1941.
Marshall continued in the same vein, saying nothing about the
Japanese intercepts he had been asked about.
On this particular Sunday morning, Bratton had been trying
to locate Marshall since 9 or 9:15 a.m. with the 14th part
of Japan’s reply and the “One p.m. Message.” When he called
73 Ibid., p. 1108.