Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Foreign Relations in an Election Year 43
being used by the Atlantic Patrol. 30 In spite of his geniality, Stark
was no doormat that FDR could walk over at will. At times he
spoke up frankly, and he must have on this occasion. FDR was
apparently reluctant also but nevertheless he decided to acquiesce
to Churchill’s request and let Britain have the destroyers. He told
Stark to make the arrangements.
Stark was depressed by FDR’s orders. Th at evening, as Admiral
Ben Moreell, chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, was leaving
his offi ce for home, he just happened to stick his head in Stark’s
offi ce to say good night. He noticed that Stark appeared downcast
and went in to cheer him up. Stark unburdened himself to
Moreell. Th e president had just asked him to give some of the
United States’s over-age destroyers to England. Stark felt that, in
ordering him to arrange the transfer, FDR was asking him to do
something illegal, thus placing him in a hopeless position. 31
Th e fi nal deal agreed upon exchanged 50 U.S. destroyers for
99-year leases on bases on the Grand Banks (Newfoundland),
Bermuda, the Bahamas, in the Caribbean ( Jamaica, St. Lucia,
Trinidad, and Antigua), and in British Guiana. 32 Stark reasoned
and then “certifi ed that the exchange . . . would strengthen the
total defense of the United States, and that by this standard
30 Patrick Abbazia, Mr. Roosevelt’s Navy: Th e Private War of the Atlantic Fleet,
1939-1942 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1975), pp. 92–95.
31 Th is high-handed disregard for legal procedure on the part of FDR was not
an isolated incident. Stark mentioned a similar incident respecting a dry dock
at Pearl Harbor (interview with author, December 10, 1962). Th is was long
before December 1941. Moreell, whose Bureau of Yards and Docks would
be constructing the dry dock, asked for written authorization. When the
president refused to authorize the transaction in writing, Stark went out on a
limb and provided it himself. Moreell completed the dock ten months ahead
of schedule, some ten days before the Japanese attack. According to Furer
(Administration of the Navy Department in World War II , p. 426) this battleship
dry dock proved “invaluable in repairing damaged ships after the attack.”
32 Walter Karig, Battle Report: Th e Atlantic War (New York: Farrar & Rinehart,
1943), p. 25.