Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

636 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
In questioning Marshall, the committee followed its usual
procedure. Its counsel led off , the Democratic members following
one by one, then the Republican members.
Marshall came before the JCC on December 6. All that fi rst
day; he was examined in a friendly manner by Mitchell. Many
of the general’s answers were evasive. Th ere were things he could
not recall, could not remember, could not recollect. When he
had appeared before the NCI in September 1944, he had not
been able to recall the intercept fi xing November 25, 1941, as
the deadline for the Japanese ambassadors to reach a favorable
conclusion in their negotiations. 69 However, when Mitchell asked
Marshall if he remembered “seeing any of those [messages] in
which the Japs instructed their Ambassadors here to get an affi rmative
agreement fi rst by the 25th of November and later at least
by the 29th” Marshall replied—his memory refreshed perhaps
by Clarke’s inquiry which had been instigated by Marshall—“I
remember that very well, sir.” 70
Th e next day Mitchell asked Marshall if he remembered his
“movements on the evening of December 6.” Marshall said he
could “only account for them by sort of circumstantial evidence.”
He enumerated a number of places where he was not. After referring
to Mrs. Marshall’s engagement book, he concluded, “the
probability is . . . we were home.” 71
Mitchell asked: “You are sure you were not at the White House
that evening?” Marshall replied, “No, sir; not at all.” 72 What did
that mean? Th at he wasn’t at the White House? Or that he wasn’t
sure he was not at the White House?
69 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 33, p. 820.
70 Ibid., part 3, p. 1091.
71 Ibid., p. 1110.
72 Ibid.