Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 635
Bratton, who usually delivered those messages, would have telephoned
me at home,” rather than going through the duty offi cer.
Mitchell pursued the matter. Gerow told the committee that
“To the best of my knowledge and belief,” he had not received or
learned of the 13-part message on the night of December 6. He
did not recall having received the earlier “Pilot Message” either. 65
And he was “positive” he had never seen “that 14-part message,
or any part of it, or the 1:00 p.m. message,” until he reached
Marshall’s offi ce around 11:30 on the morning of the 7th. 66
General George C. Marshall Does Not
Recall Important December 6–7 Events
Marshall was undoubtedly the most important witness the
committee could summon. He had been deeply involved in all
the pre-attack developments, with the possible exception of the
diplomatic phase. He was the only surviving principal in the
pre-Pearl Harbor drama still in good health and able to testify.
Roosevelt and Knox were dead. Hull had retired right after
FDR’s election for a third term and by the fall of 1944 was in poor
health and too weak to face cross-examination by the Republican
members of the committee. 67 As for Stimson, “the accumulated
strain of fi ve years in Washington had begun to aff ect his heart.”
He had resigned on his 78th birthday, September 21, 1945. 68 But
Marshall could not plead infi rmities. Th ere was no way he could
avoid testifying. Th e members of the committee had many questions.
Th ey were anxious to learn what he could tell them. And
they were anxious to learn what he would tell them.
65 Ibid., p. 1595, also p. 1632.
66 Ibid., part 3, p. 1042.
67Julius W. Pratt, Cordell Hull (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1964),
vol. 2, pp. 765–66.
68Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War
(New York: Harper & Bros., 1947/1948), pp. 331, 656, 668.