Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 633
Th e radiogram went on to say that the commander should
“undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as [he]
deem[ed] necessary.” All fi eld commander addressees were asked
to “Report measures taken.” Th e version sent to Short had an
added phrase, cautioning him “not to alarm civil population or
disclose intent.” 54
In response, Short wired that he had ordered a “sabotage
alert.” 55 Th e details of his three possible alerts were a matter of
record in Washington, 56 so Short’s “sabotage alert” gave notice to
the War Department that he had bunched his planes and placed
his ammunition where it was relatively inaccessible. He received
no response from Washington to indicate whether his “sabotage
alert” was, or was not, satisfactory. Stimson, who was responsible
for sending the November 27 message over Marshall’s signature,
saw Short’s answer, initialed it, and did nothing. 57 Gerow also
saw Short’s reply, initialed it, and did nothing. 58 As for Marshall,
there was no clear evidence that he actually saw Short’s reply; the
fi le copy did not bear Marshall’s initials; Short’s reply had been
stapled and circulated underneath a message from MacArthur,
which Marshall did initial. 59
Gerow admitted that a follow-up inquiry to clarify Short’s
response
might have been desirable. . . . [I]t would probably have developed
the fact that the commanding general in Hawaii was not
54Ibid., part 14, p. 1328.
55Ibid., p. 1330.
56Ibid., part 7, p. 2941.
57Ibid., part 11, pp. 5426, 5429.
58Ibid., part 3, pp. 1027, 1031.
59Ibid., pp. 1028–29. See also Exhibit 46, ibid., part 15, pp. 1472–75, photos of
messages routed to Marshall.