Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

632 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
committee counsel Mitchell, he knew certain things that “would
be well to lay into the record.” 50 Gerow was a much-decorated
war hero and he looked the part. Pre-Pearl Harbor he had been
the Army’s chief of war plans. During the War he became commander
of Army Fifth Corps, which had taken part in the D-Day
landings going ashore in France on Omaha Beach. He had fought
well for his country. Although not previously implicated in the
Pearl Harbor disaster, Gerow was one of the four top Washington
offi cials who had been criticized by the APHB. He was charged
with having failed to keep Short adequately informed, send a
clear, concise directive on November 27, 1941, recognize Short’s
sabotage alert as inadequate, and implement the existing Joint
Army-Navy plans. 51
Gerow was asked about Short’s response to the Army dispatch
of November 27 (#472). Th at dispatch had been prepared
by Stimson, Stark, and Gerow when Marshall was out of town,
but had been sent out over Marshall’s name, giving it the status
of a “command action.” 52 In view of the impending crisis, Gerow
testifi ed, it had been drafted primarily with the Philippines in
mind, but essentially the same message was also sent to the other
Pacifi c fi eld commanders. 53 It read in part:
Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated. . . . Japanese
future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any
moment. If hostilities cannot . . . be avoided the United States
desires that Japan commit the fi rst overt act. Th is policy should
not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that
might jeopardize your defense.
50 Ibid., p. 863.
51 Ibid., part 39, p. 264.
52 Ibid., part 2, p. 839.
53 Ibid., part 3, p. 1021.