Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 631
other places as possible objectives of Jap attack, and Hawaii is
not mentioned even then. 45
Miles admitted that it was not until December 6 or December
7 that events fi nally centered his attention on “the probable
Japanese attack somewhere coincident with the delivery of the
Japanese reply at 1:00 that day.” 46 Th e fi rst 13 parts had told them
only that the Japanese reply was unfavorable. Th e 14th part and
the message instructing the Japanese ambassadors to deliver the
reply at 1:00 p.m. were intercepted Sunday morning. “When we
got the fourteenth part . . . [and] when we got the 1:00 p.m. message,
we saw quite a diff erent picture.” 47 Th e “One p.m. Message,”
he said, “meant trouble somewhere, against someone, but still not
necessarily against the United States. However, we knew something
at last, not where or against whom, but when.” 48 However,
“1:00, as we now know, meant about 7:00, I think, in Hawaii. . . . a
likely time of attack on the islands. . . . a likely time; not the only
time” for an attack. 49
General Gerow (Army War Plans)
Offers to Relieve Marshall of Culpability
for Any Failure to Act
Th e JCC had planned to interrogate persons with background
information about the intercepts before questioning top-level witnesses,
including Marshall. However, President Truman had just
appointed Marshall ambassador to China and was anxious for
him to leave promptly for his new post. But Lieutenant General
Leonard T. Gerow was called ahead of Marshall as, according to
45Ibid., pp. 921–22.
46Ibid., p. 922.
47Ibid., p. 942.
48Ibid., part 3, p. 1362.
49Ibid., part 2, p. 931.