Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 629
mind . . . a much greater signifi cance than had it been signed . . .
[by] anybody else. 38
In Miles’s opinion Short’s response to Marshall’s warning
that he had alerted for sabotage “was a totally inadequate reply to
the message it purported to reply to.” 39 However, Miles thought
further warnings to Short, though desirable, would have been
“redundant. . . . You do not have to tell a commanding general
but once that a danger faces him. You may, however, see fi t to give
him further information as to the situation he faces.” 40
Pearl Harbor Not Mentioned in
Washington’s Pre-Attack Documents
Washington offi cialdom had known for some time that a
break in U.S.-Japanese relations was inevitable. “We were thoroughly
prepared,” Miles testifi ed, “and had been for some days to
receive an unfavorable reply to the message of November 26.” He
said he had a “very strong” impression that he fi rst knew that the
fi rst 13 parts of the Japanese reply to the U.S. so-called “ultimatum,
were in and were translated “on the evening of December
6,” certainly before he left for home that Saturday. He had called
the Army courier [Colonel Bratton], who had “satisfi ed me that
the messages were being delivered or would be delivered early
the next morning when the complete message was in.” But Miles
saw no reason that evening for alerting or waking up Marshall or
Hull. 41
JCC members Clark, Murphy, and Gearhart called Miles’s
attention to the fact that the pre-attack evaluations issued by his
38 Ibid., pp. 877–78.
39 Ibid., pp. 879–80.
40 Ibid., pp. 900–01.
41 Ibid., pp. 940–42.