Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

628 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
of that secret without specifi c authority of the Secretary of War
or the Chief of Staff .” He did not want to give the impression that
he had been “gagged by the Chief of Staff ” into trying to cover
anything up; he was only acting to protect “this vital military
secret that we were all guarding with the greatest of care.” 35 But by
the time he gave his affi davit to Clausen (August 16, 1945) and
before he testifi ed at the JCC hearings, the situation had changed
radically; the war with Japan was over and the strictures against
mentioning MAGIC did not apply.
Miles pointed out that much of the information available in
Washington “did not directly apply to the overseas departments
unless and until it became more than information and entered
the realms of an estimate of the situation which called for military
action on the part of those high commanders, and that was
a function of the command, in other words, of the Chief of Staff
himself.” Miles realized, however, that the availability of intelligence
in Washington which was not accessible in the fi eld
placed “a higher degree of responsibility” on Washington to see
that the fi eld commanders were adequately prepared, alerted, and
instructed. 36
Miles said the November 27 message sent over Marshall’s
signature had been “designed to alert the Hawaiian Department.
Th at was a command action.” 37 Miles thought Short had not recognized
the signifi cance of Marshall’s signature.
[T]he mere fact that that message was signed by the Chief of
Staff himself had a certain signifi cance. . . . Th e messages commonly
go out on the signature of the Adjutant General. . . .
[B]y putting his name to that message, it carried to any military
35 Ibid., p. 801.
36 Ibid., p. 793.
37 Ibid., p. 839.