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Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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626 <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Seeds</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Fruits</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Infamy</strong><br />

[my fortnightly summaries], anything derived from what was<br />

known as “ultra” or “magic.” 26<br />

Th e situation was further complicated by the fact that several<br />

top military <strong>of</strong>fi cials in Washington believed, or at least they so<br />

testifi ed, that Hawaii was intercepting <strong>and</strong> decoding the Japanese<br />

messages themselves <strong>and</strong> thus had access to the information<br />

Washington <strong>of</strong>fi cials were deriving from MAGIC. General<br />

Miles, Military Intelligence (G-2), told Clausen that he believed<br />

the Navy in Hawaii was decoding <strong>and</strong> translating Japanese diplomatic<br />

<strong>and</strong> consular messages, although he later told the JCC that<br />

General Short did not have decoding facilities. 27 And Admiral<br />

Turner told the JCC that it was his “belief at that time, <strong>and</strong> it was<br />

Admiral Stark’s belief, that all <strong>of</strong> these major diplomatic messages,<br />

at least in the Pacifi c, were being decrypted by both Admiral Hart<br />

[Manila] <strong>and</strong> by Admiral Kimmel [<strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>].” Turner said<br />

he “did not know that Admiral Kimmel did not hold the code for<br />

those dispatches until I was so informed at the time <strong>of</strong> the Navy<br />

court <strong>of</strong> inquiry on <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>.” 28<br />

Although these top Washington <strong>of</strong>fi cials testifi ed that they<br />

believed Hawaii had access to the same information they had in<br />

Washington, their actions belied their words. Th ey acted as if it was<br />

their responsibility to keep Hawaii advised. On November 27 both<br />

Army <strong>and</strong> Navy sent the Hawaiian comm<strong>and</strong>ers special dispatches<br />

based on MAGIC intelligence then available in Washington. Th e<br />

radiogram to Short read: “Negotiations with Japan appear to be<br />

terminated.” 29 Th e dispatch to the Navy started out: “Th is dispatch<br />

is to be considered a war warning.” 30 Army Chief <strong>of</strong> Staff Marshall<br />

said in his affi davit for Clausen that he understood Short was<br />

26Ibid., part 4, pp. 1731–32.<br />

27Ibid., part 2, p. 791.<br />

28Ibid., part 4, p. 1923.<br />

29 Ibid., part 14, p. 1328, Army’s Dispatch #472.<br />

30 Ibid., p. 1406, Navy’s November 27, 1941, “war warning” Dispatch #272337.

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