Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 625
Admiral Th eodore S. Wilkinson, who became ONI’s director on
October 15, 1941, explained to the JCC, ONI had been reduced
by then, for all practical purposes, to a fact-gathering agency. It
was no longer an analytical organization. Th e responsibility for
analysis had been taken over, theoretically, by the Navy’s War
Plans Division. 22 Stark told the JCC, ONI “had to give the material,
all it had, to War Plans. . . . But the fi nal estimate, which
went into the war plan . . . rested with War Plans.” 23 Wilkinson
testifi ed that the offi cial regulations specifi ed that ONI “Evaluate
the information collected and disseminate as advisable [italics
added].” Th us, ONI’s “responsibility for dissemination was qualifi
ed by the words ‘as advisable’.” 24 He and Turner “clashed very
defi nitely on that issue.” 25 Th is jurisdictional dispute left a crack
in the traditional channel for disseminating information to the
Navy commanders in the fi eld.
Maintaining the Secrecy of the
Japanese Intercepts
Wilkinson testifi ed on his understanding concerning the
importance of maintaining the secrecy of MAGIC, the intelligence
derived from the Japanese intercepts. He told the JCC
that
under orders from Admiral Stark, I was not authorized to
send to the fi eld information concerning secret diplomatic
conversations . . . because of the general security attached to
the code-breaking activities. . . . I was not to put anything in
22Ibid., pp. 1729, 1834–49.
23Ibid., part 5, p. 2460.
24Ibid., part 4, p. 1730.
25Ibid., part 5, p. 2460. Congressman Keefe, committee member, summarizing
to Stark his interpretation of Wilkinson’s testimony.