Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

624 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
never gave up hope, by early December it was apparent that war
between Japan and the United States was expected. 19
ONI and WPD Jurisdictional Dispute Disrupts
Customary Intelligence Dissemination
One goal of the committee in investigating “the events
and circumstances leading up to and following the attack” was
to determine what had been known by the top offi cials before
the attack in Washington, where secret Japanese messages were
regularly being intercepted, deciphered and translated, and how
much intelligence derived from these intercepts had been relayed
before December 7 to the Pearl Harbor commanders. Th e situation
was compounded by confusion over a jurisdictional dispute
between the Offi ce of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and the Navy’s
War Plans Division (WPD). When Kimmel took over the command
of the Pacifi c Fleet in February 1941, he had asked CNO
Stark to make sure that the responsibility for keeping him “fully
informed with pertinent reports on subjects that should be of
interest to the Fleet” be clearly determined “so that there will be
no misunderstanding.” 20 Stark replied on March 22, that the chief
of the Offi ce of Naval Intelligence, Captain Alan G. Kirk, was
“fully aware of [ONI’s] responsibility in keeping you adequately
informed.” 21
But the policy was changed. Admiral Richard K. Turner, chief
of the Navy’s War Plans Division, had fought and won a battle
with ONI for the exclusive right to prepare and disseminate to
the fl eet commanders information about potential enemy plans
and operations, including intelligence obtained by intercepting
and decoding Japan’s most secret diplomatic messages. As Vice
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., part 16, p. 2229.
21 Ibid., part 4, p. 1835.