Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 623
cryptographers had replicated in August 1940, yielded valuable
intelligence known as MAGIC. Exhibit 1 consisted of diplomatic
messages sent and received by the Japanese government and its foreign
establishments which had been intercepted, deciphered and
translated by U.S. cryptographers between July 1 and December
8, 1941. 15 Exhibit 2 contained intercepted messages concerning
military matters such as military installations, ship movements,
espionage reports, etc., sent and received by the Japanese government
and its foreign establishments in “Purple” and other
codes between December 2, 1940, and December 8, 1941. 16 Th e
MAGIC information derived from these intercepts had been the
basis of much pre-attack U.S. intelligence concerning the movements
and intentions of the Japanese government.
U.S. Ambassador Joseph C. Grew
Reports Pre-attack Situation in Tokyo
One of the fi rst witnesses was Joseph C. Grew, U.S. ambassador
to Japan since 1932. After the attack he had been held
under house arrest until June 25, 1942, when he was repatriated
by the Japanese government. Grew testifi ed it was “obvious that
by November 3 the [U.S.] trade embargoes had not served to
restrain the Japanese Army from its expansion. Th ey were going
right ahead.” 17 In his view, “the risk and danger of war was very
great and increasing.” 18 Japan’s totalitarian regime’s propaganda
was fostering anti-Americanism. And in Washington, the U.S.-
Japanese negotiations were clearly deteriorating. Although Grew
15 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 1, pp. 1–253.
16 Ibid., pp. 254–316.
17 Ibid., part 2, p. 677.
18 Ibid., p. 680.