Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

612 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
but had not returned a Japanese MAGIC translation. 3 Th en
in June 1942 the Chicago Tribune’s publication of the names of
the Japanese ships at Midway indicated that we had access to
secret Japanese messages. 4 As noted, during the 1944 campaign,
Marshall had succeeded in preventing Republican presidential
candidate Th omas E. Dewey from speaking out on the subject of
the secret Japanese intercepts. 5 Rumors persisted, however. But
there had as yet been no public disclosure that we had broken the
Japanese “Purple” code. For all practical purposes, information
about MAGIC had been limited to the few offi cials privy to the
intercepts before and during the war and those involved in the
investigations. And the authorities were anxious to keep it that
way. 6
Senate Bill S.805
On March 30, 1945, Democratic Utah Senator Elbert
Th omas, chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Aff airs,
introduced S.805 “to insure the further military security of the
United States by preventing disclosures of information secured
through offi cial sources.” Th is bill provided heavy penalties for
disclosing, without proper authorization, information about U.S.
or foreign codes acquired when serving in U.S. or foreign armed
forces or when employed or performing services for the United
States or a foreign government. Authorization to release such
information acquired while working for the United States “shall
be granted only in accordance with regulations prescribed by the
president.” Information acquired as a result of performing services
for a foreign government could not be released “without joint
3 Ibid., part 8, p. 3735.
4 Ibid., pp. 3735–38.
5 Ibid., part 3, pp. 1124–36.
6 Ibid., part 29, p. 2413.