Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Administration Directed Supplementary Investigations 607
conclusion of Clausen’s investigation Stimson promptly issued
an “Offi cial Report . . . Regarding the Pearl Harbor Disaster,”
dated August 29, 1945. 118 Clausen’s affi davits did not really deal
with the APHB charges, but Stimson used them and other documents
Clausen had assembled to overturn its fi ndings, especially
with respect to Marshall, and to reconfi rm the fi ndings of the
Roberts Commission. In this report, Stimson defended Marshall
and Gerow for having adequately alerted Short to the impending
crisis, defended Hull, and placed the primary blame once more
on Short.
Stimson found that insofar as the Army was concerned, Short
bore “[t]he primary and immediate responsibility for the protection
of the Island of Oahu and Pearl Harbor” and that he “was
repeatedly advised of the critical events which were developing.”
Stimson did
not fi nd that there was any information in the possession of
the War Department and which was not made available to
General Short which would have modifi ed the essence of the
above information which was sent to him or which would have
aff ected or increased the duties of vigilance and alertness thus
already imposed upon him.
His failure “adequately to alert his command to the degree
of preparedness which the situation demanded . . . contributed
measurably to the extent of the disaster. . . .”
Th is failure resulted not from indolence or indiff erence or willful
disobedience of orders but from a vital error of judgment . . .
[due to] General Short’s confi dence that Japan would not then
attack Pearl Harbor. . . .
To sum up the situation tersely, General Short was warned by
Washington that there was immediate danger both of an attack
118 Ibid., part 35, pp. 13–19.