Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

598 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
offi ce—or Adm. Noyes had telephoned the same message or
the purport of the Winds execute message to Gen. Miles or to
Col. Bratton. At any rate, Col. Sadtler was either summoned
or presented himself to G-2 and said that the Winds execute
message had come in and that something should be done right
away. . . . Col. Bratton, the Japanese language expert, wanted Col.
Sadtler to tell him what the Japanese word was that had been
included in the Winds execute message. . . . Sadtler said that he
himself had not seen the message, he had gotten the information
from the Navy source by telephone and that he therefore
couldn’t give the Japanese word. . . . [W]hen he was unable to
produce the message or the Japanese word they said there was
nothing they could do. . . . [H]e being deeply concerned about
the threat of negotiations with the Japanese Government and
noting the tenor of the messages that we were turning out in
translation, became extremely apprehensive that war might
break out at almost any hour without any declaration on the
part of the Japanese. And he felt that somebody high up in the
War Department ought to send a message out to Gen. Short
warning him . . . the type of message that he actually prepared
in his own hand: “Break in relations between Japan and United
States may be expected within the next 24 or 48 hours. Take
all necessary steps to insure that there will be no repetition of
Port Arthur.” . . . Well he tried to interest some of the people
in the higher echelons. . . . He tried somebody in G-2; he tried
somebody in Operations Division, the Secretary of the General
Staff —I can’t enumerate them all now—but at any rate he said
that he got turned down all the way and nobody would pay any
attention to him. . . .
Well, in the course of this conversation I asked him, “What do
you suppose happened to the Winds execute message which we
believe so fi rmly was intercepted?” Well he said he was told that
they were ordered destroyed. And that sort of took me aback,
and I said, “By whom?” And he said, “By Gen. Marshall.”. . . .
[M]y disbelief of the story was discredited by him apparently,
because he still remained very fi rm in his belief that all copies