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Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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Administration Directed Supplementary Investigations 597<br />

message in the <strong>of</strong>fi cial fi les <strong>of</strong> OP-20-G had been fruitless.” 96<br />

Months later, somebody higher up in the War Department—<br />

perhaps General Bissell—“directed that a search be made through<br />

our fi les at Signal Security Agency to see if we could locate such<br />

a Winds execute message, <strong>and</strong> that was fruitless.” 97 Yet Saff ord<br />

was “quite convinced that dissemination had been made to the<br />

Army, if not to the Signal Intelligence Service then to some body<br />

in G-2.” Saff ord could not explain this “mysterious disappearance<br />

. . . <strong>of</strong> all copies <strong>of</strong> the Winds execute message,” especially as copies<br />

<strong>of</strong> all the Japanese intercepts were supposed to have been held<br />

in tight security in both Army <strong>and</strong> Navy permanent fi les. Th is<br />

“mysterious disappearance” was naturally also<br />

<strong>of</strong> extreme interest to me, <strong>and</strong> some time after my fi rst or possibly<br />

second, conversation with Capt. Saff ord, I learned <strong>of</strong> the<br />

return to Washington for duty <strong>of</strong> Colonel Sadtler. We were<br />

old friends. . . . Shortly after he came back he came over to my<br />

<strong>of</strong>fi ce one day—<strong>and</strong> I don’t know whether he had specifi cally<br />

in mind to talk about <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>—he may have—but at any<br />

rate in the course <strong>of</strong> our reminiscences about those days, he told<br />

me some very startling things. . . . I asked him about the Winds<br />

execute message his recollection was apparently extremely clear,<br />

<strong>and</strong> he certainly was positive about this recollection <strong>of</strong> the fact<br />

that such a Winds execute message had been intercepted by<br />

a Navy source, because he told me that he was called over to<br />

either Gen. Miles’ <strong>of</strong>fi ce or Col. Bratton’s <strong>of</strong>fi ce . . . I recall now<br />

that he said that Adm. Noyes called him one morning <strong>and</strong> my<br />

recollection is that it was on December 4—might have been the<br />

5th—1941, saying—<strong>and</strong> this st<strong>and</strong>s very bright in my memory<br />

—“It’s in,” meaning that the Winds execute message had been<br />

transmitted <strong>and</strong> had been intercepted <strong>and</strong> that it meant a break<br />

in relations between . . . Japan <strong>and</strong> Engl<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> that he had<br />

then gone over to either Gen. Miles’ <strong>of</strong>fi ce or to Col. Bratton’s<br />

96 Ibid., part 34, p. 78 (see Hewitt, part 36, pp. 305–06).<br />

97 Ibid., part 34, p. 78.

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