Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Foreign Relations in an Election Year 39
forthcoming.” 24 Spokesmen for the United States off ered many
creative and ingenious suggestions as to how the British might
economize, scrape together as much gold as possible, liquidate
assets in the United States, and even how they might borrow by
off ering the British-owned railroads in Argentina as collateral.
Secret U.S.-British Staff Conversations
At the suggestion of the British ambassador, Lord Lothian,
on August 6 FDR sent to London for staff conversations three
U.S. military offi cers, representatives of the Navy, Army, and
Air Force—Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Rear Admiral
Robert L. Ghormley; Chief of the Army’s War Plans Division,
Major General George V. Strong; and Commanding General of
the GHQ Air Force, Major General Delos C. Emmons. Th ey
sailed on what was supposed to have been a secret mission. But
the news leaked out.
One outcome of their conference was an agreement in principle
on “methods by which the sources of information at the
disposal of the United States might be placed at the disposal of
the British Government.” 25 By agreeing to share our information
with the British, we were taking one more step away from
neutrality. Th e British were anxious that such an “exchange of
information should be placed upon a regular basis.” Lord Lothian
later “revived the proposal.” 26
24 R.S. Sayers, Financial Policy, 1939–1945 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery
Offi ce, 1956), p. 369.
25 Mark Skinner Watson, Th e War Department: Chief of Staff : Prewar Plans and
Preparations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Historical Division,
1950), p. 115.
26 Ibid., p. 118.