Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Administration Directed Supplementary Investigations 595
appreciation on the part of any of the responsible offi cers that
war was coming, and coming quickly, during the critical period
immediately preceding 7 December 1941. Th e point on which
those offi cers failed to exercise the discernment and judgment
to be expected from offi cers occupying their positions, was
their failure to appreciate, from the information available to
them, that Pearl Harbor was a likely target for aerial attack and
their failure to take the necessary steps to prevent or minimize
such a surprise attack. Each of these offi cers, in estimating
the critical situation, demonstrated a poor quality of strategical
planning, in that he largely ruled out all possible courses
of action by which the Japanese might begin the war except
through an attack in the Western Pacifi c. . . . I submit that
the importance of information from Japanese sources has been
over emphasized: for had more basically sound principles been
observed, the Pearl Harbor disaster would not have occurred.
Th e security of Pearl Harbor was the very core of our Pacifi c
strategy, a fact which did not receive suffi cient consideration in
the strategic concept of responsible offi cers.
Gatch did not recommend court martialing any offi cer,
although he held that “the Navy Department is morally obligated
to order Admiral Kimmel tried by general court-martial should
Admiral Kimmel so insist.” However, no courts martial should be
held “prior to the end of hostilities with Japan;” not only would
it be “highly impractical” but it would also “be detrimental to the
war eff ort.” 90
In his August 13 endorsement of the Hewitt report, King
held that
the evidence is not suffi cient to warrant trial by court martial of
any person in the Naval Service. . . . Admiral Stark and Admiral
Kimmel, though not culpable to a degree warranting formal
disciplinary action, were nevertheless inadequate in emergency,
90 Ibid., pp. 388–89.