Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Administration Directed Supplementary Investigations 593
If all-out reconnaissance was to be carried out in anticipation of
an attack, it was imperative not to start so soon that the planes
and crews would be exhausted when the emergency arose. As
Hewitt pointed out, when the “war warning” was received “on
27 November they had no idea that the attack was coming [1½
weeks later] on the 7th. Th ey had no way to time it. Th ey had to
make plans for patrol indefi nitely.” 85
Hewitt Inquiry Conclusions
Hewitt’s investigation was completed on July 12. Th e 134page
report reviewed the previous investigations, discussed war
and defense plans, Japanese espionage, naval intelligence, reconnaissance,
and the December 7 attack itself.
Th e NCI report had absolved Kimmel of responsibility for
the extent of the Pearl Harbor disaster. Th e Hewitt report credited
Kimmel with being “energetic, indefatigable, resourceful, and
positive in his eff orts to prepare the Fleet for war,” 86 and it recognized
the diffi culties he had faced in trying to juggle his limited
resources to maintain reconnaissance, training, anti-aircraft
defenses, patrols against submarines, and morale. However, the
report revived some of the criticism levied against Kimmel by the
Roberts Commission. It held that he did have “suffi cient information
in his possession to indicate that the situation was unusually
serious,” and yet he had “not disseminated [this information] to
all of his important subordinate commanders whose cognizance
thereof was desirable.” 87
Th e Hewitt report followed the lead of the NCI report in
attributing some of the blame for the disaster to Stark:
85Ibid., p. 297.
86Ibid., part 39, p. 526.
87Ibid., p. 524.