Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

592 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Th is scenario was followed almost precisely on December 7. Th e
sighting and sinking, shortly before dawn, of a Japanese submarine
by the destroyer Ward, was followed very shortly after dawn
by the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor by planes launched from
carriers about 200 miles away.
It was acknowledged that “Th e mission of the Army on Oahu
is to defend the Pearl Harbor naval base against all attacks by
an enemy.” 82 Th e Navy was assigned the responsibility for longrange
reconnaissance. However, there were nowhere near enough
planes or crews on Oahu to conduct long-range reconnaissance
for any length of time while training and preparing for off ensive
action in accordance with the war plan, Rainbow Five. In his testimony,
Bellinger estimated that he could have conducted
360 degree reconnaissance with the available Navy planes . . .
perhaps four or fi ve days . . . 128 degrees approximately on
a daily basis . . . until the failure of planes and lack of spare
parts reduced the planes to an extent that it would have made
it impossible. Perhaps it could have been carried on for two
weeks, perhaps, but this estimate is . . . based on maintaining
planes in readiness for fl ight. 83
Moreover, according to McMorris’s testimony,
had the maximum search been instituted from Midway and
Pearl Harbor on the 27th of November warning, the situation
with regard to aircraft engines by the 7th of December would
have been in a highly critical situation. 84
82Ibid., part 36, p. 285.
83Ibid., pp. 278–302.
84Ibid., p. 194.