Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Administration Directed Supplementary Investigations 591
on other fundamental duties.” 77 Admiral Patrick N.L. Bellinger,
commander of the Naval Base Defense Air Force, acknowledged
that there had been “sound contacts,” indicating the possible
presence of submarines, but most such reports were unconfi rmed:
“[N]o submarine was ever seen.” 78 Nevertheless, the threat of a
submarine raid was widely acknowledged as real, much more real
than the likelihood of an attack by air.
Many other witnesses conceded that an air attack on Pearl
Harbor was possible but not probable. Kimmel’s chief of staff ,
Admiral William W. Smith, testifi ed: “We were particularly
guarding against their submarine raids in the area. . . . We believed
that that was Japan’s fi rst attack to be made upon us and we made
every eff ort to guard against it.” 79 Smith knew of “no one in this
area who really believed there would be a hostile air attack on the
Hawaiian Islands.” 80
Hewitt’s inquiry revealed that the Naval Base Defense Air
Force Operation Plan, submitted April 9, 1941, by a group headed
by Bellinger, anticipated a possible air attack by planes
launched from one or more carriers which would probably
approach inside of three hundred miles. . . . A single submarine
attack might indicate the presence of a considerable undiscovered
surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied
by a carrier.
Th is plan of operations pointed out that such an attack at
dawn off ered “a high probability that it could be delivered as
a complete surprise . . . and that it might fi nd us in a condition
of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start.” 81
77Ibid., p. 193.
78Ibid., p. 293.
79Ibid., p. 201.
80Ibid., pp. 205, 212, 220.
81Ibid., part 37, p. 949.