Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

590 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
sive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale.” 70
According to Rochefort, “it was generally agreed that there was a
defi nite off ensive movement” in the works. “Th e only error made
was in the direction.” 71 All attention had been turned toward the
far west, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Th ailand.
Captain Layton, who had been fl eet intelligence offi cer for
Pacifi c Fleet, at the time of the attack, also testifi ed before Hewitt
that the Japanese Navy had changed all calls only one month
after the previous change—six months had been the usual period.
To Layton, “service calls lasting only one month indicated progressive
steps in preparing for active operations on a large scale.” 72
When he learned during the fi rst week of December that the
Japanese consul in Hawaii was burning papers, he said, “Th at fi ts
the picture that the Japanese are preparing for something, destroying
their codes.” 73 Layton said there had been several reports of
unidentifi ed submarine soundings in Hawaiian waters. 74
McCollum testifi ed that “we had suspected for some time that
Japanese submarines were keeping our fl eet based in Pearl Harbor
under observation.” 75 Vice Admiral Charles H. McMorris, who
had been war plans offi cer for CincPac at the time of the attack,
told Hewitt he considered it “highly important to maintain antisubmarine
patrols in the operating areas.” 76 He thought an air
attack on Pearl Harbor “possible but not probable and that the
fl eet should not take as its sole object of existence the defense
of itself against a surprise attack, but that it should also carry
70Ibid., p. 35.
71Ibid., p. 37.
72Ibid., p. 128.
73Ibid., p. 137.
74Ibid., pp. 164–65.
75Ibid., p. 20.
76Ibid., p. 182.