Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

588 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
the eff ect that it had been intercepted. His story was that it was
intercepted by one of their East Coast stations, he believed, and
was promptly forwarded into Washington. . . .[H]e [Saff ord]
indicated that it not only had the affi rmative for break in relations
between Japan and the United States, but it also had a
negative for a break in relations between Japan and Russia. 66
Friedman then said he had had a conversation about a year
and a half ago with Colonel Sadtler who had
indicated that the “winds” code execute message had come in
some time on the 4th or 5th of December . . . that he hadn’t
himself seen a copy, but that he had been told by somebody
that the copies had been ordered or directed to be destroyed by
General Marshall. (Italics added)
Friedman said he had “regarded this as merely hearsay evidence
and nothing more than that; highly inconceivable. . . . I
probably just passed that [story] out [to Saff ord] as one of those
crazy things that get started.” Friedman said he shouldn’t have
done it; he “certainly had no idea that he [Saff ord] would repeat
it.” 67
As a result of this June 22, 1945, testimony by Friedman,
the Clarke investigation was later re-opened to investigate the
charges.
Hewitt was interested also in the delivery of the “One p.m.
Message.” Th e 14th part of the Japanese reply was coming in
when McCollum arrived at his offi ce early Sunday morning,
December 7. While he and Wilkinson were discussing the situation
with Stark, about 8:30 to 9:00, the dispatch directing the
Japanese ambassadors to deliver their reply to Hull at precisely 1
p.m. was brought in. Stark immediately called the White House.
66 Ibid., part 36, pp. 305–06 (Hewitt).
67 Ibid.