Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Administration Directed Supplementary Investigations 587
he was Acting Secretary in the absence of Mr. Knox who had
fl own to Hawaii. 61
Th is is likely because, according to Forrestal’s schedule of
appointments, he saw both Kramer and McCollum on December
10, 1941. 62
Many argue that the reason no copies of a “Winds Execute”
have been found in the fi les is because Tokyo did not send one.
It may also be, as Kramer informed Saff ord on another occasion,
that
no written copy was furnished the Army and no written copy
was distributed in the Navy Department in the customary
manner because Admiral Noyes had given specifi c orders not
to do so and that he would handle dissemination of this message
himself. 63
Saff ord told Hewitt that he had heard through Friedman,
cryptanalyst, that “written copies of the ‘winds’ message had been
destroyed in the War Department by then Colonel Bissell on the
direct orders of General Marshall.” 64
William F. Friedman, Chief Cryptanalyst, had been responsible,
with his team in the Army cryptoanalytic bureau, 65 for having
deciphered after 18–20 months of hard concentration, the purple
(diplomatic) code in August 1940. Friedman testifi ed before
Hewitt on June 22, 1945:
61 Ibid.
Captain Saff ord indicated that . . . there had been a “winds”
execute message; that no copies of it were to be found in the
Navy fi les, and that nevertheless there had been testimony to
62 Forrestal’s appointment records (Princeton University Library).
63 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 36, p. 72, Saff ord testimony.
64 Ibid., p. 70.
65 Ibid., part 34, pp. 84–85.