Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

38 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Yet according to Morgenthau, the “present temper of the
country [was] absolutely opposed” to making loans, or anything
like that, to the British.
Phillips, the British Treasury offi cer sent to Washington to
discuss the liquidation of England’s dollar assets, told Morgenthau
the British planned to sell gold and securities to meet their defi -
cit. Th at “would have two healthy eff ects,” Morgenthau said. “It
would help to fi nance the purchase of necessary war materials,
and it would demonstrate to the American public that England
was doing everything possible in her own behalf.” And the demonstration,
that Britain was doing everything she could, “might in
time bring American opinion to support a loan or gift.” 21
1940 was an election year in the United States. Th e British
realized that “no aid could be given before the November presidential
election.” 22 Moreover, the British recognized that any
commitments made should not become public knowledge.
Nevertheless, the fi nancial talks with Phillips in July were not
too discouraging. Th ey ended with an invitation for him “to come
again in the autumn—after the election.” 23
Because the British were running out of dollars so fast, and
because exposure of London’s plight might threaten negotiations
with the United States, British treasury offi cials tried their
best to follow U.S. advice. If the British were to expect fi nancial
assistance from the United States and if the critical U.S. legislation
was to go through as speedily as possible after the election,
the American people had to be persuaded that the British were
doing their best to help themselves, that they were in fact liquidating
all their assets and gold. “Th roughout the summer [1940]
the American Administration had been by no means backward
in telling the British how they could get by until massive aid was
21 Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries, pp. 170–71.
22 Hall, North American Supply, p. 252.
23 Ibid., p.250.