Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

586 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
the fi les, and that he had been unable to locate any copies of it
at all. 58 Saff ord couldn’t understand what could have happened
to them. When Kramer testifi ed before the NCI in Hawaii during
the summer of 1944, he had not hesitated to say that the
“Winds Execute” had been received and that it referred to the
United States as well as to Great Britain. But a year later, before
the Hewitt inquiry, he was “less positive of that now.” Kramer did
“recall defi nitely being shown such a message by the GY watch
offi cer and walking down with him to Saff ord’s offi ce and being
present while the GY watch offi cer turned it over to him.” A
brief conversation ensued and then Saff ord had taken the message,
Kramer assumed, to Noyes. And that was the last Kramer
saw of it. He did not recall the precise wording of that message.
He had “a rather sharp recollection in the latter part of that week
[December 1–7, 1941] of feeling there was still no overt mention
or specifi c mention of the United States in any of this traffi c.” His
recollection was no longer clear; he was “under the impression
that the message referred to England and possibly the Dutch
rather than the United States, although it may have referred to
the United States, too.” 59
If a “Winds Execute” was received, as Saff ord claimed, he was
under the impression that it had been turned over to the Roberts
Commission. 60 But “within the past month” Kramer had told
Saff ord
that a copy of the “winds” message and other papers relative to
the break in diplomatic relations with Japan were not turned
over to the Roberts Commission but were given to Assistant
Secretary of the Navy Forrestal about 9 December 1941 while
58Ibid., pp. 68–77.
59Ibid., p. 81.
60Ibid., p.71.