Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Administration Directed Supplementary Investigations 585
1, 1941, to Admiral Wilkinson, director of naval intelligence. He
and Wilkinson had then met with Stark and “urged that a dispatch
of warning be sent to the fl eet.” Stark assured them that
“such a dispatch had been sent on the 27th of November which
defi nitely included the term, ‘Th is is a war warning’. “Subsequent
to this,” McCollum said, “the situation further deteriorated.” He
and Wilkinson “did send dispatches out to our naval attaches and
various naval agencies throughout the Far East directing that
they destroy all their codes and ciphers.” Th is was “[s]ome time
after the 1st [of December], possibly around the 4th.” 56
Regarding the “Winds Code,” there was no doubt that the
Japanese government set up a scheme of weather words with hidden
meanings. Yet, mystery and confusion surrounded practically
every other aspect of the matter. According to McCollum,
[I]n one instance it [the weather code] meant war with Russia;
in the next instance it meant war with England, and another
one . . . it meant war with the United States. Th ose were the
three possibilities.
But a literal translation of the Japanese did not actually say “war.”
McCollum went on. “Instead of war, the term used was, ‘In case
relations are in danger,’. . . . Th ere is the verbatim translation; in
Japanese this says, ‘In case there is danger of cutting off our diplomatic
relations’.” 57
When Hewitt questioned Captain Saff ord about the “Winds
Code” message, Saff ord insisted, as he had in earlier hearings,
that a “Winds Execute” had been received before the attack, that
it mentioned the United States, that it meant war, that he and
Kramer had looked at it together, that it had been delivered to
Director of Naval Communications Admiral Noyes, that later he,
Saff ord, could fi nd no reference to the “Winds Code” Execute in
56 Ibid., pp. 18–19.
57 Ibid., p. 23.