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Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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584 <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Seeds</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Fruits</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Infamy</strong><br />

whether or not Japanese submarines had been operating in <strong>and</strong><br />

around <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> prior to December 7; <strong>and</strong> also to determine<br />

Kimmel’s underst<strong>and</strong>ing <strong>of</strong> various plans for the defense <strong>of</strong> the<br />

fl eet. 53 With these goals in mind, Hewitt took testimony from 39<br />

witnesses over 26 days, from May 14 to July 11. 54<br />

As the Hewitt Inquiry opened, Captain Arthur H. McCollum,<br />

who in December 1941 had been the Offi cer-in-Charge <strong>of</strong> the<br />

Far Eastern Section <strong>of</strong> the Division <strong>of</strong> Naval Intelligence, Navy<br />

Department, reviewed the intelligence then available concerning<br />

the Far East. Hawaii was dependent on data derived from<br />

direction fi nders, radio intelligence <strong>of</strong> fl eet activities confi rmed<br />

later by newspaper accounts, <strong>and</strong> information from Washington.<br />

Before the war started on December 7, they were not permitted<br />

by U.S. law to tap telephones or intercept messages to or from<br />

the Japanese consul in Honolulu. Hawaii did not have a “Purple”<br />

machine, which would have given them access to Japanese diplomatic<br />

messages. Messages in other codes that could not be<br />

decoded in Hawaii were mailed to Washington for decrypting.<br />

After the imposition <strong>of</strong> the U.S. embargoes on Japanese trade<br />

<strong>and</strong> the outbreak <strong>of</strong> war in Europe, few Japanese merchant vessels<br />

ploughed the seas, few Japanese ships crossed the Pacifi c to<br />

ports in the Americas, <strong>and</strong> U.S. ships no longer traversed the<br />

north Pacifi c. Th us we had lost the means <strong>of</strong> keeping track <strong>of</strong> the<br />

few Japanese ships that were still sailing, as well as the “eyes” <strong>of</strong><br />

observer agents at various ports in Asia. 55<br />

Given his position at the time <strong>of</strong> the attack, Captain McCollum<br />

was able to keep abreast <strong>of</strong> developments in U.S.-Japanese relations.<br />

When McCollum appeared before the Hewitt inquiry on<br />

May 15 he brought with him “an analysis <strong>of</strong> the situation as it<br />

looked to me at that time” which he had submitted on December<br />

53Ibid., pp. 7–9.<br />

54Ibid., pp. 7–355, 361, 573–74.<br />

55Ibid., pp. 13–15.

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