Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Administration Directed Supplementary Investigations 583
2. Washington offi cials, including Marshall and Miles,
believed that the Japanese messages were being intercepted
and decrypted in Hawaii.
* * * * *
The Hewitt Inquiry (May 14 to July 11, 1945)
Upon the completion of the Navy Court of Inquiry’s report,
Secretary of the Navy Forrestal found
errors of judgment on the part of certain offi cers in the Naval
Service, both at Pearl Harbor and at Washington. Th e Secretary
has further found that the previous investigations have not
exhausted all possible evidence. . . . [and] has decided that the
[NCI] investigation . . . should be further continued until the
testimony of every witness in possession of material facts can
be obtained and all possible evidence exhausted. 51
Th erefore, Forrestal on May 2, 1945,
appointed Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, U.S. Navy, as investigating
offi cer, with John F. Sonnett as counsel, and Lieutenant John
Ford Baecher, USNR, as assistant counsel, to examine such
witnesses and to obtain such other evidence as might be necessary
in order to fully develop the facts in connection with the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. 52
After reviewing the fi ndings of the previous investigations,
Hewitt decided his task was to explore further what information
was available in Washington and at Pearl Harbor before the
attack; to ask specifi cally about intercepted Japanese telephone
and cable messages, especially the “Winds Code,” to fi nd out
51Ibid., part 36, p. 359, Forrestal’s May 2,1945, memorandum to Admiral H.
Kent Hewitt.
52Ibid., p. 364.