Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

582 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by air
and by submarine. . . . At no time did General Short inform
me or, to my knowledge, anyone else in the War Department
that he was not in full agreement with these War Department
estimates and plans for the defense of Oahu, which in eff ect
warned him to expect air and submarine attacks as primary
threats in the event of war with Japan. 49
Marshall did not say whether he had sent Short any advice
or warning later than February or March 1941 concerning the
impending crisis. However, Marshall did say that Short’s assistant
G-2 offi cer, Colonel George W. Bicknell, had seen a Navy
wire sent to Pearl Harbor on or about December 3, 1941, concerning
instructions to the Japanese diplomatic representatives
in the southwest Pacifi c, Washington, and London to burn their
codes and ciphers. 50
* * * *
Clausen’s investigation had set out to look into “unexplored
leads,” primarily for Marshall’s benefi t, about MAGIC and especially
about the Japanese response to the U.S. “ultimatum.” He
tried to discover to whom it had been delivered on December
6–7. Clausen had also inquired after the “Winds Code” and its
implementation, the “Winds Code Execute.” And he had asked
what information had been furnished General Short in Hawaii
concerning the impending crisis. Although many questions
remained unanswered, the Clausen affi davits did off er two possible
excuses for Marshall’s failure to notify Short of the developing
December 6–7 crisis:
1. Bratton and Dusenbury had been remiss in not delivering
the important 13-part Japanese dispatch to Marshall on
the evening of December 6.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid. See also p. 30, Bicknell’s February 25, 1945, affi davit for Clausen.