Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

580 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
C.G.-P.I., Hawaii—Panama. Reliable information indicates
war with Japan in the very near future stop take every precaution
to prevent a repetition of Port Arthur stop notify the Navy.
Marshall.
Sadtler hadn’t shown his draft warning to anyone in 1941, and
he had “made no copy at the time.” However, he testifi ed he had
talked with Gerow and Bedell Smith after drafting it. However,
in June 1945, neither Gerow nor Bedell Smith remembered such
a conversation with Sadtler 43 and after reading the Gerow and
Bedell Smith affi davits Sadtler believed they were correct in saying
that he had not talked with them about it in December 1941.
Moreover, Gerow didn’t believe that Sadtler, “purely a Signal
Corps offi cer,” should be “concerned with the dissemination or
interpretation of ‘Magic.’ ” 44
Sadtler also denied he had ever “urged General Sherman
Miles, G-2, or any other representative of G-2, to send any warning
message to the overseas commanders.” He denied that he had
made “further eff orts to obtain the [“Winds”] execute message
mentioned by Admiral Noyes.” And he denied Friedman’s statement
to Clarke that he, Sadtler, “had material in a safe deposit
box concerning the Pearl Harbor disaster.” 45
Clausen was in Washington on V-J day, his investigation
almost over. But he went to Boston to interview Major General
Miles, brigadier general and chief of army intelligence in 1941.
Miles said that on the instructions of Marshall, transmitted
through General Osmun and Colonel Clarke of G-2, he had said
nothing to the APHB about the top-secret MAGIC sources.
He had known about the 13 parts of the Japanese reply on the
evening of December 6 because he had been dining that evening
at Admiral Wilkinson’s home. Admiral Beardall, FDR’s
43 Ibid., p. 91, June 15, 1945 affi davit.
44 Ibid., p. 92, June 20, 1945 affi davit.
45 Ibid., pp. 99–100.